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ABSTRACT 
This book of knowledge (BoK) provides a critical review of the benefits and difficulties associated with 
using proton irradiation as a means of exploring the radiation hardness of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
systems. This work was developed for the NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Board Level 
Testing for the COTS task. 
The fundamental findings of this BoK are the following. The board-level test method can reduce the worst 
case estimate for a board’s single-event effect (SEE) sensitivity compared to the case of no test data, but 
only by a factor of ten. The estimated worst case rate of failure for untested boards is about 0.1 SEE/board-
day. By employing the use of protons with energies near or above 200 MeV, this rate can be safely reduced 
to 0.01 SEE/board-day, with only those SEEs with deep charge collection mechanisms rising this high. For 
general SEEs, such as static random-access memory (SRAM) upsets, single-event transients (SETs), single-
event gate ruptures (SEGRs), and similar cases where the relevant charge collection depth is less than 
10 µm, the worst case rate for SEE is below 0.001 SEE/board-day. Note that these bounds assume that no 
SEEs are observed during testing. When SEEs are observed during testing, the board-level test method can 
establish a reliable event rate in some orbits, though all established rates will be at or above 
0.001 SEE/board-day. 
The board-level test approach we explore has picked up support as a radiation hardness assurance technique 
over the last twenty years. The approach originally was used to provide a very limited verification of the 
suitability of low cost assemblies to be used in the very benign environment of the International Space 
Station (ISS), in limited reliability applications. Recently the method has been gaining popularity as a way 
to establish a minimum level of SEE performance of systems that require somewhat higher reliability 
performance than previous applications. This sort of application of the method suggests a critical analysis 
of the method is in order. This is also of current consideration because the primary facility used for this 
type of work, the Indiana University Cyclotron Facility (IUCF) (also known as the Integrated Science and 
Technology (ISAT) hall), has closed permanently, and the future selection of alternate test facilities is 
critically important. 
This document reviews the main theoretical work on proton testing of assemblies over the last twenty years. 
It augments this with review of reported data generated from the method and other data that applies to the 
limitations of the proton board-level test approach. 
When protons are incident on a system for test they can produce spallation reactions. From these reactions, 
secondary particles with linear energy transfers (LETs) significantly higher than the incident protons can 
be produced. These secondary particles, together with the protons, can simulate a subset of the space 
environment for particles capable of inducing single event effects (SEEs). The proton board-level test 
approach has been used to bound SEE rates, establishing a maximum possible SEE rate that a test article 
may exhibit in space. This bound is not particularly useful in many cases because the bound is quite loose. 
We discuss the established limit that the proton board-level test approach leaves us with. The remaining 
possible SEE rates may be as high as one per ten years for most devices. The situation is actually more 
problematic for many SEE types with deep charge collection. In cases with these SEEs, the limits set by 
the proton board-level test can be on the order of one per 100 days. Because of the limited nature of the 
bounds established by proton testing alone, it is possible that tested devices will have actual SEE sensitivity 
that is very low (e.g., fewer than one event in 1 × 104 years), but the test method will only be able to establish 
the limits indicated above. 
This BoK further examines other benefits of proton board-level testing besides hardness assurance. The 
primary alternate use is the injection of errors. Error injection, or fault injection, is something that is often 
done in a simulation environment. But the proton beam has the benefit of injecting the majority of actual 
SEEs without risk of something being missed, and without the risk of simulation artifacts misleading the 
SEE investigation. 
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Proton testing is often used to establish the displacement damage dose (DDD) and total ionizing dose (TID) 
capabilities of components and systems. For the types of missions considering this approach, it is expected 
that they are of short duration (less than one year) and consider the solar flare risk to be essentially mission-
ending. It is also assumed they are not being positioned into a high-TID environment (for example, mid-
Earth orbit). Because of these expectations, the potential impacts of DDD and TID are not considered in 
this BoK. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This document is a book of knowledge (BoK) intended to summarize and present the relevant material 
available regarding to board level testing of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems using proton 
exposure. We refer to this method as the proton board level test method (PBTM). This work is focused on 
development of knowledge base for the NASA electronic parts and packaging program (NEPP). The 
purpose is to provide information to help establish the validity of this type of testing for hardness assurance 
reasons and to explore the other benefits provided by this type of testing. We have limited this BoK to 
information made available over the last twenty years, in hopes of keeping it relevant. 
1.1 Current Applications 
The PBTM is currently being applied in a limited way for hardness assurance. It is used for a significant 
amount of systems to be used in lower criticality applications on the International Space Station (ISS) [1]. 
It is also being used to establish basic radiation performance on brief missions such as ISS resupply, where 
reliable operation is only required for periods of time shorter than a day. The PBTM is also being considered 
for testing of CubeSat systems, where the budget is so low that even PBTM will put significant strain on 
funding. 
Proton exposures (different from PBTM) are used to test fault tolerance (FT). FT is built into both space 
applications and high reliability terrestrial applications. This fault tolerance is often simulated with custom 
hardware or software capable of injecting environment-like faults [2]. Simulation of faults is heavily 
dependent on having an accurate model of the faults a system can manifest. Usually, however, the processes 
of developing software FT and testing devices for fault modes are decoupled, and often FT is developed 
against a reasonable simulation without actually knowing what hardware on which the FT system will be 
used. Proton testing of FT systems provides a useful way of determining the effectiveness of FT1. Hardware 
is also designed with fault tolerance (for example, parity is common in level 1 (L1) microprocessor caches, 
and error detection and correction (EDAC) is common in level 2 (L2) microprocessor caches). Hardware 
fault tolerance can be tested/verified using protons as the medium for fault injection. 
1.2 Principal Method Explored 
PBTM is a low cost alternative to device-level radiation testing that exposes full assemblies or boards to  
1 × 1010 p/cm2 [1-2]. But, as we will discuss, it provides very minimal data and very loose bounds (which 
may be very conservative). When designing electronics for space systems it is important to understand the 
effects the electronics will exhibit—especially when those effects are not in the set of behaviors the 
manufacturer designed the device to handle or produce. For high reliability operations, testing is performed 
on individual devices in order to provide a list of behaviors that flight electronics designers must handle. 
This type of device-centric isolation provides a clear boundary between device behavior and system design 
that enables definition of behaviors and makes it relatively easy to define system response. That is, device-
centric radiation data provides a clear delineation that enables system-level understanding – by enabling 
tracking of specific behaviors through the system structure. Individual device testing for radiation response 
is necessarily rather expensive, especially when considering all devices used in a system. 
PBTM does not enable the collection of device-level behaviors. It does not provide estimates of rates for 
device behaviors (unless event rates are on the order of 1/day), so, except for very common events, it can 
only provide a relatively conservative upper bound on possible space rates for events such as device failure. 
It does not empower designers with boundaries of the performance of individual devices. But the overall 
approach does enable rapid evaluation of full system performance in a very mild terrestrial test setting. And 
as we shall see later, PBTM provides evidence that a system will have a relatively high probability of 
performing for a period of 100–1000 days in the very benign ISS environment. Application to any other 
                                                 
1  Generally speaking, this requires that the tested systems are sensitive to protons or secondary heavy ions from 
proton collisions.  This generally requires sensitivity to LETs below 20 MeV-cm2/mg. 
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orbit or trajectory necessarily results in lower confidence and reduced expected days of operations—
possibly lowering rate limits to only a few days between events. 
Device-level radiation testing for SEE is intended to collect signatures and rates for various upset behaviors 
a device can exhibit. PBTM, on the other hand, is intended to provide a screen for effects that cause failure 
of a system, and to a lesser extent provides stimulus to inject single-event upsets (SEUs) into a system. 
SEUs injected into a system can be studied, and if a significant enough number of them are observed, a 
rough estimate of how often they will be observed in flight can be determined (though in order for a 
statistically significant sample to be collected, during PBTM testing, the DUT must manifest a significant 
sensitivity to upset from protons— but this then indicates a very high rate for upsets during flight. 
PBTM thus is useful for determining behavior of systems within a very narrow window. Individual device 
behaviors can be much more varied than PBTM can highlight. However, PBTM can provide test data for 
ten times less cost than individual device testing. And since it provides system behaviors, it can actually be 
very desirable for a flight project team. It is important to note, however, that lack of experienced radiation 
test operators can result in loss of any benefit in cost due to unexpected redundant testing and damage to 
test articles. 
Another important issue for this BoK is the availability of facilities for this type of work. The primary 
facility being used for this type of testing currently is the Indiana University Integrated Science and 
Technology (ISAT) hall (formerly the Indiana University Cyclotron Facility [IUCF]). ISAT was effectively 
closed in late 2014, requiring finding new options for proton testing. 
1.3 Alternate Proton Board-Level Testing 
Testing of boards with protons can be performed with a different set of goals. The PBTM discussed above 
is targeted at setting specific bounds on SEE types that may be observed when a system is placed in the ISS 
orbit. However, proton testing of boards and assemblies can be conducted with other goals in mind. In this 
document we will discuss the limitations placed by the PBTM (1 × 1010/cm2) approach, when used in 
different environments and test contexts. 
PBTM is well-situated for producing loosely bounded upper limits on possible space event rates in the ISS 
orbit. But 200 MeV (or other energy) protons can also be used for board-level testing in the following ways. 
First, it can provide very rough information on whether a board or system has significant rates for damaging 
effects from SEE. It can be used for fault injection—by putting upset SEEs (e.g., single bit upsets [SEE], 
single event transients [SETs], etc.)– into the system and observing the response. The only significant 
problems with using protons for this type of testing are the limited sampling of space-like particles and 
linear energy transfers (LETs), possible hardware difficulties (such as ensuring protons are not traversing 
down the edge of the chip, which can lead to erroneous results), and ensuring that the operation of the test 
board close matches its operation in space. 
Unfortunately, the best data that can come out of a proton board-level test—the PBTM or other types of 
tests—requires observing many upsets. This is because significant numbers of upsets can be closely 
correlated to estimated space rates of the observed upset types. However, systems upsetting this frequently 
will be very difficult to operate in a space application. 
1.4 Purpose of BoK 
This BoK is focused on critical review of the 1 × 1010cm2 PBTM and similar approaches to estimating or 
bounding space rates for SEEs on full boards or assemblies. We surveyed available literature and 
communicated with several primary organizations involved in this type of testing, including Johnson Space 
Center (JSC).  
In this document we will explore and analyze the material available and present conclusions about this type 
of testing. This method is gaining in popularity, partially due to increased use of pre-built COTS assemblies 
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and partially due to efforts to reduce cost. This BoK takes the position that the PBTM and similar uses of 
proton beams as sole radiation assurance testing will be used, at least in limited cases. Thus, the approach 
here is not to try to show that these methods are good or bad, but rather to discuss their merits in various 
environment and mission design situations. 
1.5 Document Layout 
This BoK will review materials related to board-level proton testing and application of this type of testing. 
The material we cover pertains to a general use practice that is currently applicable for low criticality 
programs running on the ISS. For this type of program, several reports regarding systems and devices 
running in this type of test are available. We will review these, as well as counter or breadth arguments 
such as the example of the HM65162 16 kb static random-access memory (SRAM), which would pass the 
proton board level test some of the time but would readily fail in ISS orbit with a mean time between failures 
(MTBF) of about 100 days. 
Because of the possible uses of proton board level testing, there are a lot of sub-topics to cover. This BoK 
is arranged as follows. First we provide background information on the primary methods of testing and the 
limitations of their application-to-event rate calculation, focusing on available literature. We then discuss 
the PBTM and other board-level proton test approaches. A simple example is used to illustrate the situation 
in the following section. This BoK then concludes with some information regarding recommended future 
work. 
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2.0 PROTON BOARD-LEVEL TEST METHOD 
This section presents background on proton testing of boards and systems for SEE. We begin with a brief 
presentation of the most relevant environment for using the PBTM. Then we review available literature and 
materials that describe or explain methods that use proton testing to establish mission reliability. This is 
divided into a general discussion of how particles cause upsets and then a discussion of proton interactions 
with device materials. Then we discuss how proton testing can increase what is known about SEE response 
beyond the case of no testing. Then we review the PBTM, providing details about how it works. We then 
discuss alternate uses of proton board level testing. Key limitations of the approach are discussed in detail 
in Section 3. 
2.1 Review of Available Materials 
This section discusses key materials and information available that form the basis of PBTM. We focus on 
environment, testing, proton generation of upsets and secondary particles, material specifically on PBTM, 
and the expected benefit achievable with PBTM. 
2.1.1 Environment Discussion 
SEE sensitivity is critically important for space missions. The SEEs occur because of individual particles 
in the space environment that can cause circuits to perform incorrectly or become damaged. We begin this 
section by reviewing the environments of interest for spacecraft and explaining our focus on the ISS orbit. 
In general we must know the number of particles that pass through the components in a spacecraft during 
a given time period. In practice, we require the estimated fluence of particles in two different forms—the 
number of protons, with their energy spectrum; and the number of heavy ions, with their LET spectrum. 
This information is specific to the orbit or trajectory of a spacecraft and is generally time dependent. In 
addition, natural environments also include a chance of particle contribution from solar flares. For this work 
we focus on the environment of the ISS to keep the document focused and enable direct use of most of the 
relevant reference material. 
The ISS orbit is at 51.6° inclination with varying altitude, generally taken to be about 400 km. The 
environment is composed primarily of low- to moderate-energy protons and heavy ions. The protons are 
due to a combination of galactic cosmic rays and Earth’s inner trapped particle (Van Allen) belt, with a 
significant portion coming in a region known as the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) where the inner belt 
dips into the ISS orbit. There is also a small component of high energy galactic cosmic rays (GCRs), but 
they primarily have low LETs and are only important when the question of shielding is considered because 
shielding increases their LETs. The proton spectrum is given in Figure 2-1, and the heavy ion LET 
spectrum is given in Figure 2-2. 
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Figure 2-1. The integral proton flux spectrum for the ISS orbit , excluding flares Boeder 1994 [3]). Note that by 200 MeV the 
spectrum is falling off very quickly. 
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Figure 2-2: Integral LET spectrum for the ISS orbit behind various amounts of aluminum shielding (Boeder 1994 [3]). 
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Figure 2-3: Example of upsets in DRAMs - showing correlation with higher latitudes and the SAA (koontz2005 [4]). © 2005 IEEE 
 
An example of the distribution of particle interactions in the ISS environment can be seen in the DRAM 
upsets reported by Koontz and shown in Figure 2-3 [4].  The increasing GCR contribution at the higher 
latitudes can be seen by the increase in the density of errors there.  Also, the SAA is obvious by the 
clustering of errors near Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. 
As stated above, this document is limited to the case of the ISS environment, in order to keep the material 
focused. The arguments do apply to other environments with the general understanding that the greater the 
GCR component in the environment (and therefore reduced geomagnetic shielding), the less effective 
PBTM will be. This occurs because PBTM works best when the majority of the environment consists of 
particles with LETs below 15 MeV-cm2/mg, and protons with low- to moderate energies. The two 
environments where PBTM may work better than for the ISS (for determining SEE sensitivity) are low-
inclination low Earth orbit (LEO), and middle Earth orbit (MEO). They are both expected to have very little 
GCR component, but MEO missions are expected to have much stronger parts-level radiation requirements 
due to total ionizing dose (TID). 
Solar flares are a component of the ISS orbit. When they occur they may or may not affect satellites near 
Earth because individual flares do not cover the entire orbit of the Earth. Generally, if a flare is likely to hit 
Earth, satellites are intentionally commanded into a low vulnerability mode, because a large portion of the 
SEU-sensitive components in the satellite will likely upset. This upset sensitivity is especially true for 
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COTS. When a flare hits, systems have to expect a very high number of upsets will occur. The ISS 
environment during a solar flare is augmented by both protons and heavy ions, with proton energies possibly 
well over 1 GeV, and heavy ion LETs similar to the GCR spectrum. The heavy ion solar flare spectrum is 
given in Figure 2-4  from [3]. In the case of solar flares, shielding does help significantly. At 50 mils of 
aluminum shielding, however, the solar flare orbit-averaged maximum heavy ion fluence for LETs below 
20 is increased more than 1000 times that of normal. Because spacecraft that have been planned to survive 
a solar flare must have a known TID response of components, solar flares are essentially outside of the 
planning of any mission utilizing PBTM. For this reason, and the expectation that the spacecraft is largely 
powered down during a flare, we do not discuss them further.  
 
Figure 2-4: Maximum solar flare orbit-averaged integral heavy ion fluence [3]. 
2.1.2 Shielding 
Generally it is expected that shielding will significantly reduce radiation effects with a “workable” increase 
in mass. This is not true for SEE. The reason is that shielding is most effective at reducing TID, by stopping 
particles that are moving very slowly. But those particles do not cause significant SEE risk. Instead, SEE 
is primarily caused by high energy particles that require at least inches of material to significantly attenuate. 
Furthermore, protons are most effectively shielded by low atomic number (Z) material, while heavy ions 
are most effectively shielded by high-Z material. So there is no mass-efficient shielding material to stop all 
SEE-causing particles in the space environment. As a practical example of this, Figure 2-4, above, shows 
the difference between 50, 1000, and 7000 mils of aluminum shielding on the LET spectrum experienced 
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in electronics in the ISS orbit (without flares) [3]. The difference between one and seven inches is about a 
factor of ten decrease in particles across the entire spectrum. In contrast, usually at least 50 µm of Aluminum 
is used to shield spacecraft in the ISS environment because this clearly reduces the TID below 1 krad/year 
– but the difference between 50, and 1000 µm is not significant above 1 MeV-cm2/mg, except for a 
reduction of perhaps a factor of 3 between 3 and 15 MeV-cm2/mg.  
2.1.3 Normal EEE Parts Testing for Critical Applications 
EEE parts must have known or bounded radiation response, within the mission parameter envelope. It is 
important to highlight that this document is focused on SEE only, and that issues regarding appropriateness 
of proton testing for TID or displacement damage are not relevant here. Under a full program for evaluating 
the SEE risk of EEE components, often a full evaluation of single-event latchup (SEL) and SEE 
performance is performed over a full range of simulated environmental particles. This means that a device 
is either tested for both heavy ion sensitivity as a function of LET and proton sensitivity as a function of 
energy; or it is tested for one of these two, and the results are then used to provide a limit for the response 
of the system to the other. 
The main issue at question in this BoK is the suitability of protons to be used in ground testing intended to 
simulate the space environment. SEEs are often taken to occur when a threshold of generated charge, called 
the critical charge [Qcrit], is exceeded during the passage of a charged ion through a sensitive volume (SV) 
[5,6].The general picture is shown in Figure 2-5.  
 
Figure 2-5: Ions passing through matter leave an ionization trail. When the charge is released in a sensitive volume it can result 
in an upset if it exceeds the critical charge. 
 
The ionization produced per unit path length by the ion in the SV, the LET, is dependent on the ion’s atomic 
number, energy, and the material it is going through. This is given by the Bethe-Bloch equation given 
below. (1) is relativistic, (2) is non-relativistic. 
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In these equations z is the charge of the moving ion, E is its energy, n is the electron number density in the 
target, I is the mean excitation potential, c is the speed of light, β is the speed of the particle divided by c, v 
is the velocity of the particle, ε0 is the permittivity of the vacuum, e is the electron charge, and me is the 
mass of the electron. LET is dE/dx normalized to the density of the target material. The charge deposited is 
proportional to the product of the LET and the distance the ion travels through the SV (the chord length). 
A key element of the theory of equivalence of terrestrial and space SEE is that this LET is constant 
throughout the SV, which is the case when the energy is not changing significantly. When determining a 
mission’s expected environment, the distribution of ions as a function of LET is based on ions that have, 
on average, the LET observed. If the LET is changing during ground testing, then the correct LET to assign 
is not obvious. 
Ground-based proton testing can cover the entire range of proton energies observed in LEO due to trapped 
particle belts [3]. When being used to explore the sensitivity of devices to heavy ions, however, proton 
secondaries lack some key properties. The secondaries are key to the approach as the incident proton has a 
maximum LET of 0.01 [TRIM/SRIM]. We will discuss this in more detail in section 3. The key for now is 
to point out that nuclear reaction secondaries produced from 200 MeV proton interactions have relatively 
short range, and during their transit of the SV their LET may be changing significantly.  
In practice, several efforts to find ways to use heavy ion data to predict proton rates, and vice-versa, have 
been pursued [7,8,9]. Aside from rare proton situations, such as tungsten plugs [10], using heavy ions to 
provide rough estimates for the worst case proton sensitivity has been relatively successful. Alternately, for 
some classes of parts and representative technologies (i.e., those with a small charge collection volume), 
protons provide a good estimate of heavy ion sensitivity [11,12]. In some important cases, however, proton 
test results are not good for predicting heavy ion sensitivity [13], especially in cases where no events are 
observed. This is particularly true when the effect is dependent on long ion ranges, such as for SEL [14]. 
Although proton testing is not necessarily good for predicting heavy ion sensitivity. It is possible that a 
proton test can enable a relatively inexpensive bound on total radiation sensitivity. A proton test of an entire 
board can be less expensive than a heavy ion test on a single type of device on the same board. Thus, the 
PBTM is an effort to bound the possible response of a system for which very little SEE information is 
known. The relevant issue, however, is the following. If PBTM can establish an upper bound for system 
SEE sensitivity, how does this bound differ from what must be assumed if no SEE test data exists on some 
or all of the components in the system. Both of these bounds are discussed later in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
There are two situations that can arise from proton testing. Either upsets are not seen, or they are seen. In 
the former case, the previous paragraph applies. But in the case where upsets are observed, proton testing 
can often provide useful rate estimates for environments with both heavy ion and proton contributions. This 
happens because an SEE that is observed with protons is likely to have sensitivity to heavy ions with LETs 
in the range of 2–12 MeV-cm2/mg, with the effect largely saturated by LETs above 10 MeV-cm2/mg, and 
in this range proton secondaries do provide a good distribution of injected ion LETs. 
2.1.4 Proton Interactions in Materials 
Protons can produce low-energy secondary ions with relatively large atomic number (Z). These particles 
then have fairly large LET because of the z2 dependence in the stopping power (see equation 1). But these 
secondary ions have low energy in terrestrial testing because of kinematic limitations. Low energy means 
that the ions are depositing energy very quickly and about to stop. In this range, the ion’s LET is changing 
rapidly. In order to establish the appropriateness of proton secondaries to simulate the space environment 
for high LET particles, it is important to have the two following pieces of information in mind: (1) the rough 
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size of sensitive volumes for SEE; and (2) the range over which the particle has a slowly-varying LET. In 
this section we discuss material that establishes these. 
As a specific example, relatively high energy transfer can occur in the proton + Si elastic collision where 
the collision is head-on with the Si nucleus starting at rest and having final momentum in the direction the 
proton had initially. In this case, the non-relativistic version of conservation of momentum results in the 
following equation (3) for the energy of the outgoing Si nucleus. 
 𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 4𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
�𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝+𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�
2, (3) 
where mp is the mass of the proton, mSi the mass of the silicon nucleus, and Ep is the initial kinetic energy 
of the proton. In the case of 200-MeV protons, the outgoing energy of the silicon nucleus is 26.6 MeV. This 
corresponds to an LET of approximately 14 MeV-cm2/mg, but a very short range. 
Significant studies of the reaction products of protons in a primarily Si target have been performed by 
Heimstra (2003) [15] and Schwank et al. (2005) [10]. In particular, Heimstra  is a detailed study of the 
energies and LETs that are produced as proton secondaries. A plot of LET versus range is given in Figure 
2-6 for reaction products from 500-MeV protons, which is evidenced by the maximum range of Si given as 
about 25 µm— corresponding to an energy of about 65 MeV. Note that many ions other than Si can be 
produced. A more detailed discussion of reactions is available in Messenger and Ash (1997) [5]. 
 
Figure 2-6: Range versus LET for ions generated in 500 MeV proton interactions in Si devices (Heimstra 2003 [15]). © 2003 IEEE 
 
The most important considerations relative to these reaction products are the ranges and relative abundances 
produced at a given range as a result of 1 × 1010/cm2 of 200-MeV protons. This is discussed as a difficulty 
with PBTM in Section 3. 
Another issue to cover is than protons can interact with atoms other than silicon in a target device. There 
are also dopant atoms and metals used in bonding the device to the external pins. If these atoms are involved 
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in the process of creating secondaries, the LET of the secondaries can be considerably higher than the 
phosphorus limit in Figure 2-6. This is explicitly explored in the case of tungsten (W) plugs [Schwank 
2005]. 
2.1.5 Review of PBTM Materials 
This section briefly lays the groundwork for the current situation regarding PBTM. More detail is developed 
later in this section. The key elements of the approach discussed here were developed by the Johnson Space 
Center (JSC) in an effort to improve the situation of electronics with no known evaluation of radiation 
sensitivity. The first relevant paper that discusses this test method is O’Niell (1997 [8]). This paper draws 
from two other important predecessors. Specifically, in Petersen (1992) [7] the relationship between proton 
energy threshold and heavy ion LET threshold is drawn, allowing calculation of proton rates from heavy 
ion data and vice versa, but acknowledging the idea is to estimate rates generally, but not catch outlier 
cases. Second, in McNulty (1994) [16], a careful study of the spallation reaction spectrum resulting from 
protons impinging on a silicon device was performed. 
After the initial discussion of the method, a few supporting papers were made available. In O’Niell (1998) 
[17] the applicability of PBTM is extended, indicating a very low chance that any SEE with a rate higher 
than 1 per 10 years would not be observed during 1 × 1010/cm2 irradiation with 200 MeV protons. The 
method was reviewed using a Monte Carlo simulator to explore more of the stages of the nuclear 
interactions. In Foster (2008) [18] the method of calculating LEO MTBF is examined from the perspective 
of energy deposition. 
The most significant problem with using proton testing to estimate heavy ion upset contributions in various 
orbits is the relationship between the spectrum produced by proton exposures and the natural spectrum 
which includes high LET particles. O’Niell (1997) [8] pointed out that the test method necessarily does not 
determine sensitivity to part of the natural spectrum, with about twenty particles per year having no effective 
simulation by the proton recoil spectrum. This was studied in Heimstra (2003 [15] with an evaluation of all 
ions produced during the exposure as discussed in Section 2.1.4. The specific findings regarding how many 
particles are not simulated is not well agreed upon. This is one of the key difficulties discussed in section 
3. 
In addition to the issues with mismatching range and changing ion LET, there are also modern device 
questions. The initial work was based on earlier technologies, and did not focus on SEL and SET in more 
modern devices. Koga et al. (2002 [19] performed a detailed exploration of this problem. It should be noted 
that the general concern of unknown, possibly very complex, interaction between proton and heavy ion 
upset sensitivities was found to be worse for new technologies. Additional counterexamples of the 
comparison were provided in Edmonds (2002) [20] and [Normand 2004]. It can only be inferred that 
technologies in the last decade continue to have the risk of not having well-defined relationships between 
proton and heavy ion SEE sensitivity. 
The key material reviewed above relates to events with deep SVs where no upsets were observed during 
testing. However, many upsets will be observed during testing. But the majority of these will result in 
misbehavior of the system with no permanent failures. Of course, depending on the system architecture, a 
simple microprocessor hang can be mission ending. Based on O’Niell (1998) [17] and several papers that 
discuss predicted proton and heavy ion event rates in the many different types of devices [Normand (2004) 
[21],[Koga et al. (2002) [19], [Allums (2012)[1]], and others, it is clear that devices that upset during PBTM 
will have largely predictable on-orbit rates because the ISS orbit includes a significant proton fluence. and 
additional GCR proton and heavy ion exposure will also contribute to the error rate. Foster et al. (2008) 
[18] provides specific information regarding how to calculate the LEO MTBF by first measuring the device 
proton cross section at 200 MeV, then apply the energy deposition distribution method (EDEPDIST) to 
develop a modified cross section that takes into account how well the proton 200-MeV energy deposition 
spectrum matches that of the ISS environment particles. Examples from [Foster 2008] are provided in Table 
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2-1 below. Note that the corrected cross section is derived from the EDEPDIST method. Also, Weibull 
parameters are developed to enable calculation of the LEO MTBF. It is clear, from the table, that some 
devices will have upsets more than once per day. Note that this list of example devices is several years old, 
and modern systems are expected to have even higher potential ISS-orbit upset rates (e.g. tens of 
SEUs/SEFIs per day. 
Table 2-1: Cross sections from proton testing, EDEPDIST, and Peterson FOM, are compared. Predicted MTBF is developed using 
the NASA Johnson Space Center code HIZ Badhwar (1996) [22]. The HIZ MTBF is given, as is the multiplication factor for the 
case of no upsets is also fiven. Weibull parameters based on the EDEPDIST method are available in (Foster et al. (2008)) [18]. 
This table is from Foster et al. (2008) [18]. © 2008 IEEE 
 
 
2.1.6 When No Upsets Are Observed 
One of the possible observations during PBTM testing is to not observe any upsets. In this case, based on 
the discussion above, we know that the device has been exposed to a significant number of particles with 
LETs up to 15 MeV-cm2/mg. However, we do not know what types of upsets the device may be sensitive 
to and what the appropriate SVs might be. For this reason it is difficult to know exactly what the limiting 
cross sections might be for various event types. However there are some worst case and most common 
limits that have been studied. These can be somewhat understood in the context of the energy deposition 
method of Foster et al. (2008) [18] where the energy deposited in the SV is considered. Under this approach, 
the primary issue is to understand how much energy may have been deposited in the sensitive volume. 
Although other SEE types may be of concern, the most significant SEE type of concern here is SEL. This 
is because SEL can have a very long charge collection depth. An example of how this can be a problem is 
shown in Dodd et al. (2007) [14] where the threshold LET for SEL was found to be about two times lower 
when ions with higher energy (but the same LET) were incident on the DUT. 
Rather than establish a theoretical working point for the worst case SEL risk, we take the approach of 
focusing on devices with known SEL sensitivity that may pass PBTM with no observed proton SEL 
sensitivity. We consider two devices. The first is the HM65162, discussed in Edmonds (2000) [13] – the 
1985 device. This device is known to have a proton cross section of 1.4x10-10cm2/device. Thus it has a 
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reasonably high chance of being missed during a PBTM test with 1x1010/cm2 exposure. This device has an 
SEL rate of 0.01/device-day. This is not the only device with this type of SEL rate. Table 2 below can be 
used to find some alternatives, such as the NEC4464, which has an SEL rate of about 0.005. 
For upsets that have relatively shallow charge collection depth, PBTM can be coupled to the method 
described in O’Niell (1998) [17].  where the expected MTBF is roughly 2000 days/# of SEE observed 
during testing. But where you take the number of SEEs as 1 (or, alternately, the 2-sigma upper bound for 
observing 0 SEEs, which would be 3.7). So the MTBF can be taken as 2000 days (or 540 days for the 95% 
confidence interval). We use the value 0.001/device-day for the remainder of this BoK. 
It should be noted that PBTM is known to be of limited value for critical systems because of the fact that 
protons cannot be guaranteed to behave like heavy ions. Thus there is the clear possibility of unexpected 
sensitivities being missed during this testing (i.e., PBTM necessarily has known deficiencies that can be 
tested and should not be left unexplored in critical systems). The use of PBTM is recommended for non-
critical systems only [8]. 
2.1.7 If Upsets Are Observed 
For event types that are observed, PBTM provides a more straightforward way of determining event rates 
in space. This happens because of the abundance of protons in the ISS orbit, and may not apply easily to 
other orbits. The difficulty is in determining the relationship between proton cross section with 200-MeV 
protons, and event rates with the full proton spectrum. This, unfortunately, is only approximately correct 
without detailed information about the SV of the observed event type. The most basic approach is to employ 
the PROTEST solution (O’Niell, 1998) [17], which is approximated by an MTBF of 2000/N days, where 
N is the number of events observed when exposing the device or system to 1 × 1010 p/cm2. For more detailed 
study, it is possible to determine a proton cross section curve and apply the Bendel method (see Bendel and 
Petersen (1983) [23]). 
In the case where upsets are observed, the test system then also becomes a platform for error injection. If 
useful, engineers can use this test scenario to explore how errors are handled. This is discussed in more 
detail in Section 2.4. 
2.2 Why PBTM Is (Nearly) Optimal 
PBTM may be considered as an approach to the multidimensional optimization problem of reducing 
potential risk of a system through limited testing. Although clearly performing more tests at the device 
level, deducing the specific device behaviors and expected rates, would yield more complete data, as an 
approximate approach PBTM sits in a narrow range. We will explore these issues in this section. The first 
element to the discussion is that PBTM is not likely to result in excessive TID exposure. The second is that 
ions with LETs in excess of 10 MeV-cm2/mg are produced in the active components. The third is that the 
beam range used for PBTM is at a relative sweet-spot in terms of availability (or at least was before the 
closure of IUCF). The final point is that PBTM utilizes beams that are near the cutoff of the energy spectrum 
in the LEO orbit. 
There are two reasons why the 1 × 1010/cm2 PBTM approach is an optimal (or nearly optimal approach). 
The first is that 1 × 10-10 p/cm2 at 200 MeV results in about 600 rads of exposure. (In contrast, 1×1010 p/cm2 
of 50-MeV protons would result in approximately 2,000 rads of exposure. Although there are some devices 
that degrade with only 600 rads, they are rather rare. But failures with dose become much more common 
as the dose increases. The dose is proportional to the dE/dx in Silicon, which is shown in Figure 2-7. With 
this figure it can be seen that increasing proton energy results in decreasing dose for a fixed fluence, up to 
proton energies around 2–3 GeV. 
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Figure 2-7: dE/dx of protons in Si - calculated from Bethe-Bloch. 
 
As indicated above, the dose would be lower for the same fluence if the energy were increased to 2–3 GeV. 
However, availability of beams is another important part of the optimization problem. There are some 
locations, such as the Tri University Meson Facility (TRIUMF) and the Los Alamos Neutron Science 
Center (LANSCE) that can provide beams above the 200–250 MeV range of typical cyclotrons [24,25]. 
Realistically, it is currently unknown what facility availability will be in the near future due to the IUCF 
closure Higher energies (above 2 GeV) may be available from specialized facilities but are generally much 
more expensive than the typical rates for cyclotrons producing protons in the 200–250 range. It should be 
noted that this range is also a standard range for proton medical treatment facilities and may prove to be 
readily available from many sources [26]. 
The third reason the PBTM approach is nearly optimal is that 200-MeV protons are capable of producing 
secondary heavy ions with LETs (at the point of production) above 10 MeV-cm2/mg. The spectrum of 
produced particles has been explored, primarily through the use of Monte Carlo simulation tools and is 
reported in [31] and [32].  The spectrum of LETs due to various recoil particles is shown in Figure 6 above 
[15]. The approximate production of particles with a given LET or higher when a device is exposed to 1 × 
1010 p/cm2 is shown in Figure 2-8 [8]. 
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Figure 2-8: Fraction of events that produce at least a given LET, due to exposure to 200 MeV protons (from O'Niell et al. (1997) 
[8]. © 1997 IEEE 
 
2.3 Where We Are with No Testing 
As discussed above, the reason PBTM is used is to reduce the risk of flying a system without comprehensive 
SEE test data. In the case where there is no SEE testing is performed for a system, there is usually some 
knowledge of the SEE sensitivity of many of the parts. For the sake of discussion, we focus on a typical 
system. Without justification, but based on engineering experience, we assume a typical system has 
approximately 65 components. So the question becomes, about how many of these components can be 
expected to have some SEE data, and how many may be the critical ones for the worst case SEE estimations. 
And of the worst case devices, how bad are they? A rough survey of how these devices may be triaged is 
in order. In a typical system, many of the devices will have no data, but will come from known product 
lines that have common, or at least bounded behavior. For example, some devices will be known to be 
constructed on an epitaxial layer or silicon on insulator (SOI) and will therefore exhibit reduced or no 
sensitivity to SEL (in any case the sensitivity will be below what can be established by the proton test). 
Based on experience triaging parts lists, it is expected that 2/3rds of the parts, or about 40 of the 65, will 
have enough existing data that SEE performance can be bounded to be better than the worst case established 
by the PBTM. The remaining 25 or so parts, however, may have problems. Most likely the remaining 
questionable devices will include a handful of unknown logic gates, a handful of power control devices 
such as metal oxide semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs), 10–15 or so memory devices – 
including flash and electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), SRAM, and 
DRAM, and a handful of special single instance devices. The special, single instance devices include field 
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), microprocessors, microcontrollers, and other application-specific ICs 
(ASICs). There may also be a few devices with SET sensitivity. Generally, it is necessary to analyze these 
devices in a generic way, but focused on a couple classes of SEEs. 
Without testing, there are three primary types of SEEs that the system may be sensitive to which must be 
considered. The most important SEEs of interest are damaging SEEs. These include single-event gate 
rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB), SEL, and a few other (potentially) permanent failure 
modes. Second is the single event functionality interrupt (SEFI) which may or may not be possible to 
recover without a power cycle. And third are single-event upsets (SEU). Many SEUs will manifest as SEFIs, 
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and for system sensitivity reasons, they will be treated as SEFIs here. So SEUs are specifically those events 
that manifest as a bit flip that is isolated but may result in a calculation error or similar effect. SETs are 
often not important by themselves (though they can sometimes cause damage), but they can manifest a 
system behavior of SEFI or SEU. 
Table 2-2 provides SEL information compiled from many sources [21]. In Table 2-2, the onset LET is L0, 
the saturated cross section is σHI limit, the shape parameter is s, and the width parameter is w. Petersen 
(1998) [12] provides the figure of merit (FOM) and limiting cross section for proton SEL (σSEL(Ep) 
limiting), along with details about the source of the data in the paper. We take the specific case of the 
DSP96002, where σHI = 0.49 cm2. L0 = 0.1 MeV-cm2/mg, S = 4.5, and W = 21.4. Using this, with the Creme 
96 rate calculation code Tylka (1997) [27], we obtain a nominal rate for SEL of 1.54 × 10-2/device-day 
(assuming a width to depth ratio, L, of 0.2 for the rectangular parallelepiped [RPP]), and a worst-case of 
7.14 × 10-2/device day (for L~0.01).  
In addition to this, Schwank et al. (2006) [28] provides proton cross section data for several SRAMs, 
including a 180-µm SRAM with a proton cross section of 2 × 10-8 cm2/device. Based on the PROTEST 
approach (discussed in the next section), this device would have a predicted SEL rate of 0.1/device-day. It 
should be noted that the cross section for this device increases with angle of incidence, so it is reasonable 
to predict this device may have an even higher SEL rate. 
A similar event rate can be inferred from proton test data on SEGR and/or SEB, where devices experiencing 
permanent failure due to these mechanisms under protons have inherently high failure rates. With these 
failure mechanisms, device sensitivity depends significantly on the implementation, so systems not 
designed for radiation environments are more likely to show these problems. Under some scenarios, devices 
have been observed to have mean time to failure (MTTF) of 0.1/device-day and exhibit failures in proton 
testing with cross sections on the order of 1 × 10-8 cm2. 
Certainly there is no guarantee that a device with SEL or SEGR/SEB performance this bad will actually be 
part of the system. However, without testing and without other information to support robust design 
arguments, this type of failure rate must be inferred. Thus, a reasonable worst case MTTF for a system not 
tested with the PBTM would be on the order 0.1/board-day.  
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Table 2-2: Tabulation of parts susceptible to SEL with information about proton SEL sensitivity (from Normand (2004) [21]). 
(References cited in the table are to that document.) © 2004 IEEE 
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2.4 Use of Proton Board Level Testing 
The specific case of 1 × 1010/cm2 proton exposures with 200-MeV protons has been used frequently over 
the last 15 years. It has been used to specifically check and provide related examples for the PBTM method. 
Also, it has been used to provide data for flight programs. In general, PBTM exposures have been limited 
to non-critical systems, or performed in combination with other tests that reduce risk after PBTM is used. 
In the case of critical systems, PBTM usually shows no SEE vulnerability before additional testing is 
performed. As indicated in Allums et al. (2012) [1], the approach used by JSC is a “Go/No-Go” screen for 
payload applications, supplemental avionics, and crew support equipment. In this section we review 
available documents presenting PBTM and PBTM-like data sets. 
Using proton upset counts during the 1 × 1010 p/cm2 exposure, the space rate for the same event type is 
obtained by using the PROTEST code, as indicated in [O’Niell 1998,2]. Alternate methods for calculating 
space rates are presented or used in Foster et al. (2008) [18], Allums et al. (2012) [1], and others. Although 
there may be some differences in the papers, a reasonable estimate of the predicted rate for an event seen 
during PBTM testing is approximately an MTBF of 1800/N, where N is the number of upsets observed. 
This is a simplification and does not include statistical uncertainty in the test sample’s ability to predict the 
population (i.e., the confidence interval on the population, as a result of the test sample, is not taken into 
account). Alternately, the EDEPDIST method provides a more technology-specific range of MTBF 
examination; however, it is clear that the appropriate SV is not always obvious. For the specific case of 
epitaxial substrates and SOI, the predicted MTBF of 1800/N is probably somewhat conservative, but for 
other event types there is no good guidance unless heavy ion data is also available (at which point PBTM 
has limited value). 
PBTM data has been reported several times over the years, primarily for parts used for the ISS program 
[4,29,30]. An example table from Allums et al. (2012) [1] is given in Table 2-3. The MTBF is generally 
based on 6 years divided by the number of observed events, which is consistent with the 1800/N indicated 
above (the first line is somewhat different, based on the composite nature of the data and the test engineer’s 
analysis). Similar data is available from several similar sources. It should be noted that all examples indicate 
that for critical operations additional testing would be performed. Also it should be noted that some of the 
information in Table 2-3 comes from composite systems, such as laptop computers that were tested by 
targeting specific test positions on the test article that would correlate to irradiating memory chips, 
microprocessors, hard drives, and etc. 
Table 2-3: Entries from PBTM testing for ISS programs from Allums (2012) [1]. 
 
There is recent interest in migrating PBTM to be a more comprehensive tool for mission assurance. This 
includes possibly making PBTM the only assurance test for critical systems, or using systems that are 
observed to upset during PBTM testing. These efforts are still in development and it is unclear if they will 
resolve into a viable toolset. The main issue in recent applications of PBTM beyond the non-critical ISS 
components discussed above is the limited increase in expected MTBF of components. However, some 
systems are employing FT and redundancy such that small increases in assurance are magnified by powers 
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of three or more (i.e., a 0.05 probability of failure in a specific unit translates to a 6 × 10-6 (0.054) chance of 
system failure). Because this type of magnification of increased mission assurance may be a good way to 
handle multiple types of problems (including COTS traceability and outlier concerns), it is possible that 
PBTM will add enough increase in assurance that it continues to gain traction and PBTM gains wider use. 
The recent loss of the primary PBTM facility— ISAT (formerly IUCF)—likely means that alternate 
facilities will be employed, and this is not likely to have a direct impact on the application of PBTM. 
2.5 Possible Alternate Uses 
Aside from assuring missions by reducing the risk of possible SEE failures in a space environment, proton 
testing of electronic components can be used for other research. Protons are a relatively inexpensive way 
to inject errors in devices and systems, enabling testing of fault tolerance [2]. Proton upsets are very similar 
to neutrons, with the possibility that neutron cross sections may be larger by factors of three to ten [31]. 
Thus protons provide an alternate source for injecting faults that are similar to expected terrestrial faults. 
It should be noted that a proton test can quickly identify if a system will meet its space FT requirements, 
because flight-like faults will be present. Thus, any unimplemented (or incorrectly implemented) FT 
systems will be observed. A good example of this is a microprocessor that bypasses FT to meet performance 
requirements, such as operating a parity-protected cache in a mode where the parity protection causes 
crashes rather than enabling error correction. As with the case of PBTM, however, a null result (no faults 
observed) will not provide adequate verification of FT systems. 
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3.0 A SIMPLE EXAMPLE 
In order to illustrate what the available research and applications cases provide us, a simple example may 
be extremely beneficial. We will discuss the points developed in this BoK using the straw-man mission and 
design parameters listed below. 
1) Low-Earth orbit (LEO) (similar to ISS – 450 km 51.6° inclination) 
2) Single board payload 
3) Approximately 100 mils of Al shielding 
4) Power conversion circuits for five power domains (each with a regulator, a few MOSFETs or linear 
power devices, feedback circuitry, and an analog-to-digital converter (ADC)) 
5) Recharging circuitry – solar 
6) Communications electronics 
7) Computer system with one processor, five high speed memories (SRAM), two buffer memories 
(SRAM), and two storage devices (one NAND flash, one EEPROM) 
8) Computer interface and isolation 
9) Four instruments with an average of one microcontroller, one SRAM, and a couple sensor chips 
10) Pyro system with a few ADCs, DACs, logic devices and a microcontroller 
Altogether, this list of subsystems will comprise approximately 65 active components with the following 
approximate distribution: 
1) High speed microprocessor – 1 
2) Microcontrollers – 5 
3) SRAM memories – 12 
4) Regulators – 4 
5) MOSFETs – 12 
6) NAND flash – 1 
7) EEPROM – 1 
8) Oscillators – 4 
9) Logic devices – 15 
10) ADCs – 4 
11) Digital-to-analog converters (DACs) – 1 
12) Interface or Isolation - 6 
13) Others – 5 
3.1 SEE Evaluation Limited to Analysis Only 
If this type of list were available for a system to be used in LEO, with no other information than part 
numbers/bill of materials, an initial estimate of possible system failures can be determined and generally 
follows as such: approximately 45 of the 65 devices can be triaged as having SEE rates below 0.1% in 
10 years – which is much better than the other 20; so these 45 are removed. Of the remaining 20 devices, 
the worst-case device can potentially be as bad as 1% chance of failure per day for 1 cm2 of device area— 
with this failure being permanent damage to the device. With no testing, it is necessary to use this number 
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as an upper bound. Realistically if a device with this high a rate is on the board, there are probably a few of 
them (i.e., they are likely to be SRAMS), but it is possible there is no device this bad. In the latter case, it 
is generally necessary to assign a rate of 0.15%/device-day for permanent failure to each remaining device. 
When considered in the context of 20 devices with unknown radiation risk, the final rate is approximately 
3%/system-day for permanent failure. It should also be expected that on the order of 10 SEUs/Gb-day may 
occur in volatile memory, and on the order of 1 permanent bit flip/Gb-day may occur in non-volatile 
memory. 
3.2 SEE Evaluation Similar to Flagship Missions 
A full SEE test campaign is the other extreme. In this case the remaining 20 devices above would require 
testing for potentially damaging SEEs—damaging SEL and SEGR or other events (including loss of critical 
memory). Assuming any device found to have a risk of damaging SEE during testing is removed and 
replaced with an alternate, the individual device rates drop to below 0.0002%/device-year. This is much 
lower than the initial triage of the remaining 45 devices. So this approach only makes sense if the entire set 
of devices is reviewed this way, or if devices are only tested to the 0.01%/device-year level. In the most 
conservative case (all devices tested to below 0.0002%/device-year), the failure probability for the board is 
below (1-(1-0.000002)65) ≈ 0.013%/system-year. If instead, the triage level of 0.01%/device-year is used, 
the failure probability for the board is below (1-(1-0.0001)65) ≈ 0.65%/system-year. In both cases, these 
failure probabilities are upper bounds, and should not be used as expected rates (except for worst-case 
design efforts). 
3.3 SEE Evaluation Using PBTM 
The focus of this BoK is neither of the above approaches. Instead, the PBTM lies between the two 
approaches above (and far closer to the first, high failure probability, case). Using the PBTM, the system 
would only be tested in a flight operating scenario. Ideally during the test the system would go through all 
of the states seen during flight with operating time ratios for each state proportional to the amount of space 
SEE exposure expected; but realistically this is impossible to achieve without already knowing the SEE 
sensitivity. Because the PBTM includes irradiation of all devices, the system expected failure rate should 
be based on the number of devices in the test (because the likelihood of a device luckily passing the test 
increases linearly with the number of devices tested). In some literature and application cases, this linear 
calculation is not made (likely due to the very similar number of devices in most applications). The 
predicted system failure rate if no damaging events are seen during PBTM is taken to be 1%/system day in 
this case (see Section 3). Keep in mind this is for the ISS orbit, which is very similar to the most benign 
orbit possible. This discussion is roughly consistent with the following interpretation of the proton test. 
For the 20 devices with unknown SEE response, the proton test is the only data the mission will have. As 
discussed above, it is possible for a device to pass the proton test but have an approximately 1%/device-
day chance of a catastrophic failure. However, it is unlikely that such a device is on the test board. Thus, 
we fall back to the alternate rate of 0.1%/device-day for permanent failure – and it is reasonably assigned 
to 10 of the 20 parts. The other 10, due to technology and other parameters, are assigned failure rate limits 
of 0.005%/device-day. In this case, the probability of permanent failure can be calculated as  
(1-(1–3 × 107)45(1-0.001)10(1-0.00005)10)) ≈ 1.1%/system-day. This is about the same as if the system had 
the worst-case device. This is about 2 to 3 times better than without testing. 
As illustrated here, the key to when the PBTM is useful is when a factor of 2 makes a difference. Because 
space environments and other parts of a system have margin, it is important to note that this factor of two 
has to be at the end of the calculation, and be magnified, for it to be much good. 
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3.4 Other Uses of Proton Data 
One other set of data comes from the PBTM. Aside from damaging events, it is also possible to have SEEs 
such as SEU where the system has an error but is expected to be able to fully recover from the error. The 
recovery cases range through: self-correction (averaging out of a bad reading), shutdown of some function 
till commanded to recover from the ground, or on-board fault tolerance detecting and recovering from the 
SEU. 
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4.0 CONCLUSION 
This book of knowledge has focused on the available information regarding using the proton board-level 
test method to improve the assurance of systems. The key available materials break down in three ways. 
First, there are the papers specifically discussing the method and what it provides. These primarily involve 
how the 1 × 1010/cm2 200 MeV test can establish bounds to the performance of systems that pass the test 
where passing the test generally means the system functions nominally after the test, but may have had 
errors during the test. When there are errors, the papers provide ways to estimate how often the test 
observations will likely occur during a space mission. These papers also make it clear that this method, 
when applied to critical systems, is only a screen that is followed up with a more complete test regimen 
such as subsequent heavy-ion exposure. The second type of material can generally be considered a set of 
data and arguments that are fairly consistent with the theory papers in the first set, but it provide a set of 
counterexamples indicating the potential danger of using the system and how it can fail to accurately predict 
the failure rates of devices – where this finding is sometimes based on anomalous devices, and other times 
on modern processes that have different response. The third type of reference material available is papers 
that provide test data related to performance of PBTM. 
The papers reviewed indicate some interesting things about what PBTM can tell us. We reviewed several 
papers that describe PBTM. These papers range from basic description of the particles produced and how 
they relate to the ISS/LEO environment, all the way to examples comparing proton and heavy-ion 
sensitivity at the levels suggested by PBTM. 
The key to when the PBTM is useful is when a factor of ten makes a difference. We provided a critical 
review of available “worst-case” devices that suggests that devices with an MTTF of ten days are possible 
on a COTS assembly. We also showed how the available literature can be used to argue a resulting MTTF 
between 100 and 2000 days for systems tested with the PBTM, with the 100-day MTTF being for critical 
SEL events. Because space environments and other parts of a system have margin, it is important to have a 
very well-established understanding of what the required performance is, and what performance bounds are 
achieved without testing. It is also important to determine if design rules and device information can be 
reviewed which may allow further bounding of the SEE response in a way that may marginalizes the value 
of the PBTM. That is, it is possible that analysis may provide the majority of the possible benefit of PBTM. 
However, for a true COTS system, it is likely that enough uncertainty remains that the majority of the factor 
of ten improvement will require proton testing to achieve. 
It should be understood that the past use of PBTM has been entirely for low criticality systems for use in 
the very benign LEO environment at the ISS. General application to a larger set of environments is likely 
to be very problematic and at least require significant theoretical development to establish the potential 
benefit. It is unlikely, however, that the predicted MTTF will improve for any other space environment 
compared to the LEO/ISS environment. 
This BoK has focused on the available information regarding the PBTM. Implementation of PBTM is 
equally important. At present there are problems with facility availability due to the closure of the IUCF. 
Further, a best practices guideline for carrying out PBTM may be of significant benefit. Additional 
development of this topic can include extension of the theory to alternate environments (recall this BoK 
focuses on available materials, which are currently only developed for the ISS/LEO environment). 
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5.0 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ADC analog-to-digital converter 
ASIC application-specific integrated circuit 
 
BoK  book of knowledge  
 
COTS commercial-off-the-shelf 
 
DDD displacement damage dose 
DRAM dynamic random-access memory 
 
EDAC  error detection and correction 
EDEPDIST  energy deposition distribution method 
EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read-only memory 
 
FPGA field programmable gate array 
FT fault tolerance 
 
GCR galactic cosmic rays 
 
ISAT Integrated Science and Technology (hall) 
ISS International Space Station 
IUCF Indiana University Cyclotron Facility 
 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
 
L1 level 1 
L2 level 2 
LEO low Earth orbit 
LET linear energy transfer 
 
MEO middle Earth orbit 
MOSFET metal oxide semiconductor field-effect transistor 
MTBF  mean time between failures 
MTTF  mean time to failure 
 
NAND negative and 
NEPP NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (program) 
 
PBTM proton board-level test method 
 
RPP  rectangular parallelepiped 
SEB single-event burnout 
SEE single-event effect 
SEFI single event functionality interrupt 
SEGR single-event gate rupture 
SEL single-event latchup 
SET single-event transient 
SEU single-event upset 
SOI silicon on insulator 
SRAM static random-access memory  
SV  sensitive volume  
 
TID total ionizing dose 
 
Z atomic number 
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